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TUG-OF-WAR, MARKET MANIPULATION
AND OPTION PRICING
K. NYSTRO¨M, M. PARVIAINEN
Abstract. We develop an option pricing model based on a tug-of-
war game. This two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game is
formulated in the context of a multi-dimensional financial market.
The issuer and the holder try to manipulate asset price processes in
order to minimize and maximize the expected discounted reward.
We prove that the game has a value and that the value function
is the unique viscosity solution to a terminal value problem for a
parabolic partial differential equation involving the non-linear and
completely degenerate infinity Laplace operator.
1. Introduction
A feature of illiquid markets is that large transactions move prices.
This is a disadvantage for traders needing to liquidate large portfolios,
but there are also situations where traders may benefit from moving
prices. For example, a trader holding a large number of options may
have an incentive to impact the dynamics of the underlying and to move
the option value in a favorable direction if the increase in the option
value outweighs the trading costs in the underlying. There is some
empirical evidence, see [GS00], [Pir01], [KS92], that in illiquid markets,
option traders are in fact able to increase the value of a derivative by
moving the price of the underlying.
We consider option pricing in the context of a two-player zero-sum
stochastic differential game in a multi-dimensional financial market. In
the game, the issuer and holder of the option try, respectively, to ma-
nipulate/control the drifts and the volatilities of the assets in order to
minimize and maximize, respectively, the expected discounted reward
at the terminal date T . An important contribution is that we estab-
lish a connection between option pricing and a tug-of-war game. In
2010 Mathematics Subject Classification. 91G80, 91A15, 91A23, 60H15, 49L25,
35K59.
Key words and phrases. Infinity Laplace, non-linear parabolic partial differential
equation, option pricing, stochastic differential game, tug-of-war.
Acknowledgements. The authors are grateful to two anonymous referees and the
managing editor for their careful reading of the paper and their valuable comments.
This work was partly done during a visit to the Institut Mittag-Leffler. MP is
supported by the Academy of Finland.
1
2 K. NYSTRO¨M, M. PARVIAINEN
the prevailing model for option pricing, the governing partial differen-
tial equation is the Black-Scholes equation. In our context, the partial
differential equation becomes substantially more involved due to the
presence of the non-linear and completely degenerate infinity Laplace
operator.
1.1. Price dynamics. First we give a heuristic description of the price
formation process. Let
S(t) = (S1(t, ω), ..., Sn(t, ω)) : [0, T ]× Ω→ Rn+
be the stochastic process which represents the prices of n assets at
time t ∈ [0, T ]. To keep mathematical tractability, we formulate the
dynamics of S = S(t) as a system of stochastic differential equations
for the vector of log-returns
X(t) = (X1(t, ω), ..., Xn(t, ω)) : [0, T ]× Ω→ Rn,
Xi(t) = log(Si(t)) for i ∈ {1, ..., n}.
Let (Ω,F,P) be a probability space satisfying the standard assumptions
and let {ξi,k}, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n, n + 1}, k ∈ N, be sequences of i.i.d
random variables such that
P(ξi,k = 1) = 1/2 = P(ξi,k = −1).
In particular, each ξi,k represents the outcome of a standard coin toss.
We let Fk be a filtration of F to which {ξi,k} are adapted.
Let N ∈ N denote our discretization parameter. We let XNi,k denote
the state of the log-returns of asset i after step k. At this level, the
model can be expressed as
XNi,k −XNi,k−1 = a random walk increment with drift
+ an increment resulting from price manipulation
modeled as a tug-of-war game.
To be more precise, at step k of the game, a sample of (ξ1,k, . . . , ξn+1,k)
is generated. For component i ∈ {1 . . . , n}, the contribution from the
random walk with drift is modeled as
µi
N
+
2√
N
σiξi,k,
where µi ∈ R and σi > 0 represents the magnification of the step 2ξi,k.
Volatility can vary from the asset to asset.
Next, let {θ±k } = {(θ±1,k, . . . , θ±n,k)} be Fk-adapted random variables
such that θ±k ∈ {x ∈ Rn : |x| ≤ 1/
√
N}. The sequences {θ+k }, {θ−k },
correspond to the control actions of the maximizing and minimizing
player in a tug-of-war game. In particular, it is assumed that each of
the two players can affect the price process and push it in a favorable
TUG-OF-WAR, MARKET MANIPULATION AND OPTION PRICING 3
direction but turns are taken randomly. In this setting, the increment
of component i, at step k, based on coin toss ξn+1,k, is
2σi
(
θ+i,k
(1 + ξn+1,k)
2
+ θ−i,k
(1− ξn+1,k)
2
)
= 2σi
(
(θ+i,k − θ−i,k)
2
ξn+1,k +
(θ+i,k + θ
−
i,k)
2
)
.
Again the actions of the players are magnified by the factors {σi}.
Put together, the positions of the log-returns after j steps are XNj =
(XNi,j, ..., X
N
i,j), where
XNi,j =xi + µi
j
N
+
2√
N
σi
j∑
k=1
ξi,k
+ 2σi
j∑
k=1
(
(θ+i,k − θ−i,k)
2
ξn+1,k +
(θ+i,k + θ
−
i,k)
2
)
.
We define {WNi (t)}t≥0, i ∈ {1, ..., n+ 1}, by setting
(WN1 (0), . . . ,W
N
n+1(0)) = 0
and using the relations
WNi (t) = W
N
i ((k − 1)/N) +
(
t− k − 1
N
)√
Nξi,k,
whenever t ∈ ((k−1)/N, k/N ], k ∈ N. Moreover, we define continuous
time processes by setting
XN(t) = XN[Nt], θ
±,N(t) =
√
Nθ±[Nt].
With this notation, the above dynamics becomes
XNi (t) = A
N
i (t) +B
N
i (t) + C
N
i (t), i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (1.1)
where
ANi (t) = xi +
∫ t
0
µids+
∫ t
0
σidW
N
i (s),
BNi (t) = σi
∫ t
0
(θ+,Ni (s)− θ−,Ni (s))dWNn+1(s),
CNi (t) = σi
∫ t
0
√
N(θ+,Ni (s) + θ
−,N
i (s))ds.
Then, by passing to the limit, using Donsker’s invariance principle,
ANi (t) → xi +
∫ t
0
µids+
∫ t
0
σidWi(s),
BNi (t) → σi
∫ t
0
(θ+i (s)− θ−i (s))dWn+1(s),
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as N → ∞ where Wi, Wn+1, are standard and independent Brown-
ian motions. To understand the continuous time limit of the outlined
price dynamics, as N → ∞, the key difficulty is to understand the
asymptotic behavior of the term CNi (t). A solution, due to [AB10] in
the context of time independent equations, is to replace
√
N with dy-
namically controlled quantities d+ and d−. This approach is motivated
by the connection between tug-of-war games and the infinity Laplace
operator in [PSSW09]. Therefore, as described later, the core of the
model is given by
dXi(s) =
(
µi + σi(d
+(s) + d−(s))(θ+i (s) + θ
−
i (s))
)
ds
+ σidWi(s) + σi(θ
+
i (s)− θ−i (s))dWn+1(s),
(1.2)
with sufficient assumptions on the controls d±, θ±.
1.2. Fair game option pricing. Let (Ω,F, {Ft},P) denote a com-
plete filtered probability space with a right-continuous filtration sup-
porting an (n + 1)-dimensional and {Ft}-adapted Brownian motion
W = (W1, ...,Wn+1). We assume that all components are independent.
There are two competing players, one maximizing and one minimiz-
ing, which both attempt to control and manipulate the log-returnsX(t)
of the underlying assets. Denote by Sn−1 the unit sphere of Rn. We let
H := Sn−1 × [0,∞),
and
A+ := A+(t) := (θ+(t), d+(t)), A− := A−(t) := (θ−(t), d−(t)),
where
θ±(t) ∈ Sn−1, d±(t) ∈ [0,∞), t ∈ [0, T ],
are {Ft}-adapted stochastic processes representing the control actions
of the maximizing and minimizing player. Heuristically, θ±(t) denote
the directions and d±(t) the lengths of the steps taken by the players.
AC denotes the set of all admissible controls. Each player also chooses a
strategy ρ±, which represents a response to the actions of the opponent,
i.e. the strategies ρ± are functions from the space of controls to the
space of controls. S denotes the set of all admissible strategies. Detailed
definitions of (admissible) controls (AC) and strategies (S) are given
below in Definitions 2.1 and 2.2. Using this notation, the dynamics of
the log-returns is given by (1.2).
Note that in (1.2), the time-dependent controls of the players en-
ter in the drift coefficient, and in the diffusion coefficient of the one-
dimensional Brownian motion Wn+1. Hence, this part of the dynamics
is degenerate in the sense that it is possible for the players to completely
switch off the one-dimensional Brownian motion Wn+1.
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Given A± = (θ±, d±) and a pay-off function g at T , we set
J (x,t)(A+, A−) := E[e−r(T−t)g(X(x,t)(T ))]
= E[e−r(T−t)g(X(T ))] (1.3)
where the superscript (x, t) indicates that the game starts at position
x at time t. The expectation E[·] is taken with respect to the measure
P.
Definition 1.1. The upper and lower values of the stochastic dynamic
game, denoted U+(x, t) and U−(x, t), are defined
U+(x, t) = sup
ρ+∈S
inf
A−∈AC
J (x,t)(ρ+(A−), A−),
U−(x, t) = inf
ρ−∈S
sup
A+∈AC
J (x,t)(A+, ρ−(A+)).
The game is said to have a value at (x, t) if U+(x, t) = U−(x, t). If
U+(x, t) = U−(x, t) =: U(x, t), then we say that U(x, t) is the fair
game value of the option.
1.3. Statement of main results. Our fair game value of the option
is related to the degenerate partial differential operator F
F (u,Du,D2u) :=
2
|Du|2
( n∑
i,j=1
uxixjuxiuxjσiσj
)
+
1
2
( n∑
i=1
σ2i uxixi
)
+
n∑
i=1
µiuxi − ru,
(1.4)
where Du := (ux1, ...., uxn)
′, and D2u is the matrix consisting of the
second order derivatives. We consider the terminal value problem{
∂tu+ F (u,Du,D
2u) = 0, in Rn × (0, T ),
u(x, T ) = g(x), on Rn.
(1.5)
Solutions to (1.5) have to be understood in the viscosity sense (see Def-
inition 2.5 and 4.1). Concerning g, we adopt the following convention:
throughout the paper it is our standing assumption that the function
g is a positive bounded Lipschitz function, i.e.
sup
x∈Rn
g(x) + sup
x,y∈Rn,x 6=y
|g(x)− g(y)|
|x− y| ≤ L, (1.6)
for some L < ∞. The assumptions concerning boundedness and posi-
tivity of g are only imposed to minimize additional technical difficulties.
The main result of the paper is the following.
Theorem 1.2. Let g be as in (1.6) and let U± be the upper and lower
values of the stochastic dynamic game as in Definition 1.1. Then,
U+ ≡ U− on Rn × [0, T ]
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and U := U+ ≡ U− is the unique viscosity solution to (1.5). In partic-
ular, U(x, t) is the fair game value of the option.
Remark 1.3. In the original Black-Scholes model, the arbitrage free
price of a simple European contract is, after changing to log-returns,
the unique solution to the Cauchy problem for a linear second order
uniformly parabolic equation (heat equation). In contrast, in our con-
text, the underlying PDE is much more involved due to the presence
of the non-linear and completely degenerate infinity Laplace operator.
Naturally, the fair game value U is different from the value produced
through arbitrage free option pricing.
Remark 1.4. Note that our set-up may seem unrealistic: it should
be costly for the players to influence the asset prices. However, as dis-
cussed below, we can introduce a running cost to the model and Theorem
1.2. In this case, the fair game value of the option will be the unique
viscosity solution to the non homogenous problem (1.9) below. How-
ever, for simplicity of exposition, we only prove Theorem 1.2 without a
running cost.
Example 1.5. Consider g : Rn → R defined by
g(x1, ..., xn) = max{K − w1ex1 − ....− wnexn , 0} (1.7)
where w1+ ....+wn = 1, wi ≥ 0, and where K, the strike, is a positive
real number. Then g represents a put option written on the index
w1S1(T ) + .... + wnSn(T ) = w1e
x1 + .... + wne
xn
with strike K. Obviously g satisfies (1.6) for some L <∞.
1.4. Relation to the literature and economic relevance. By def-
inition, option pricing is devoted to the valuation of options and other
contingent claims, and, since the pioneering papers of Black-Scholes
[BS73] and Merton [Mer73], it has also found its way into many appli-
cations beyond finance.
To put our model into context, it is relevant to first recall that the
models in [BS73], [Mer73] are derived based on stylized assumptions
concerning the market. However, they are based on fundamental eco-
nomic principles.
While the Black-Scholes model is derived based on the idea of no
arbitrage, our model is based on the idea that, in addition, the price
is influenced by a tug-of-war between two players: the issuer and the
holder of the option. As such, our model touches on the mathematical
modeling of illiquid financial markets and market manipulation, and
the use of stochastic differential games for option pricing.
A substantial part of the literature on illiquid financial markets fo-
cuses on either optimal hedging and portfolio liquidation strategies for
a single large investor with market impact, see for example [CJP04],
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[AFS10], predatory trading, see [BP05], [CLV07], [SS07], or the prob-
lem of market manipulation using options, see [Jar94], [KS92]. For
example, in [Jar94], it is shown that by introducing derivatives into
an otherwise complete and arbitrage-free market, certain manipulation
strategies may appear for a large trader. The strategic interaction be-
tween large investors and implications for market microstructure are
discussed in [Kyl85], [FV96], [BCW00], [CV08]. The papers [BP05],
[CLV07], [SS07], consider predatory trading, where liquidity providers
try to benefit from the liquidity demand of large investors.
For zero sum stochastic differential games, we refer to [FS89], [HL95],
and for nonzero sum games to [Fri72], [BCR04], see also [Nis88], [BL08].
In general, there seems to exist only a limited literature devoted to the
integration of game theoretical aspects, like strategic financial decisions
of agents, into continuous time frameworks. We are only aware of two
lines of research in this direction.
One line seeks to account for model uncertainty using control the-
ory. The idea is to introduce optimal and risk-free strategies in security
markets, based on which traders try to meet their obligations when,
for instance, the volatility is unknown or uncertain. This is an alter-
native approach, which in the end is deterministic, to option pricing
and contingent claim hedging. In [Lyo95], the author develops a robust
control model, in multi-dimensional markets without friction, assuming
that the volatility is unknown and only assumed to lie in some convex
region depending on the prices of the underlying securities and time,
see also [ALP95] and [AP96]. In [Lyo95], the PDEs associated to the
control problems considered are fully non-linear parabolic equations of
Pucci-Bellman type. This approach to option pricing is also developed
in [Mce97], where the author proves that option prices in standard
models can be characterized as viscosity solutions of the corresponding
Hamilton-Jacobi equations. Similar robust control problems are also
considered and developed in [Be12], see the references in [Be12] for an
overview of contributions in this direction, and [Kol13].
Another line, which appears in [Zie04], develops a method which de-
couples into three steps: (i), the formulation of a game among players;
(ii), the valuation of future uncertain payoffs using (standard) option
pricing theory; (iii), the resolution of the game for the optimal strate-
gies, starting from the last decision to be made, using backward in-
duction or alternative methods. A strength of the approach in [Zie04]
is that (ii) and (iii) are separated steps, enabling the integration of
established methods for each step.
Our model and this paper represent a new and different line of re-
search devoted to fair game option pricing and intuitively appealing
stochastic differential games modeled as tug-of-war games. Within our
model, we see at least three areas for further exploration. First, the
fair game value of the option is derived based on principles different
8 K. NYSTRO¨M, M. PARVIAINEN
from no arbitrage and it is an interesting problem to understand the
relation between these two different approaches. Second, while this pa-
per is mainly of theoretical nature, it is important to study (1.5) from
a numerical point of view. This may require novel methods due to
the presence of the non-linear and completely degenerate infinity and
parabolic infinity Laplace operator. Third, adding American, Asian or
other features to the underlying derivative, our setup paves the way for
extensive studies of completely new PDE problems related to tug-of-
war games.
As discussed in Remark 1.4, it may seem unrealistic that the players
can influence the asset price without a cost. However, this can be
incorporated by introducing a running cost. Let h : Rn × [0, T ] → R
and assume that there exists α > 0 such that h(x, t) ≤ −α for all
(x, t) ∈ Rn × [0, T ]. Given A± = (θ±, d±), h, and g at T , let
J˜ (x,t)(A+, A−) := E
[∫ T
t
e−r(T−s)h(X(x,t)(s), s) ds
+e−r(T−t)g(X(x,t)(T ))
]
(1.8)
where, again, the superscript (x, t) indicates that the game starts at
position x at time t. Let U˜± be defined as in Definition 1.1, but based
on J˜ instead of J . Then, see also Remark 1.4, Theorem 1.2 can be
generalized to this situation and, under sufficient assumptions,
U˜+ ≡ U˜− on Rn × [0, T ].
Furthermore, U˜ := U˜+ ≡ U˜− is the unique viscosity solution to the
non homogenous problem{
∂tu+ F (u,Du,D
2u) = −h(x, t), in Rn × (0, T ),
u(x, T ) = g(x), on Rn.
(1.9)
In this case, U˜(x, t) can be referred to as the fair game value of the
option accounting for the cost of influencing the asset price (transaction
cost).
1.5. Brief outline of the proof of Theorem 1.2. The difficulty
encountered when proving Theorem 1.2 stems from the unboundedness
of controls and strategies and from the potential degeneracy of the
underlying dynamics. To overcome the unboundedness of the action
sets, we first approximate the original stochastic differential game by a
sequence of games with bounded controls ACm and bounded strategies
Sm, with bounds tending to∞ as m→∞. The upper and lower values
of the associated stochastic dynamic games are defined by
U+m(x, t) = sup
ρ+∈Sm
inf
A−∈ACm
J (x,t)(ρ+(A−), A−),
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U−m(x, t) = inf
ρ−∈Sm
sup
A+∈ACm
J (x,t)(A+, ρ−(A+)),
where J (x,t) is given in (1.8). The upper and lower values are unique.
An important step is to connect the value functions to viscosity solu-
tions to the following terminal value problems involving Bellman-Isaacs
type equations:
∂tu−H+m(u,Du,D2u) = 0 in Rn × (0, T ),
u(x, T ) = g(x) on Rn, (1.10)
∂tu−H−m(u,Du,D2u) = 0 in Rn × (0, T ),
u(x, T ) = g(x) on Rn. (1.11)
The operators H±m are introduced later and, here, we simply note that
the equations in (1.10), (1.11), are non-linear parabolic equations and
that these equations are the relevant Bellman-Isaacs equations asso-
ciated to our problem in the case of bounded controls. Comparison
principles and uniqueness of viscosity solutions to (1.10), (1.11) follow
along the lines of Giga, Goto, Ishii and Sato, see [GGIS91], by using
doubling of variables as well as the theorem of sums. Existence is es-
tablished by the construction of appropriate barriers and by the use of
Perron’s method, see Section 2.
In Lemma 3.1, we prove that the unique solutions to (1.10), (1.11),
u±m, satisfy
u+m = U
+
m, u
−
m = U
−
m. (1.12)
In other words, the unique solutions to stated terminal value problems
produce the upper and lower values of the associated stochastic games.
The proof uses Ito’s formula and estimates for stochastic differential
equations.
To continue, we prove in Lemma 5.1 that
H±m → −F as m→∞.
To complete the proof of Theorem 1.2, a key step is to prove that there
exists m0 ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, such that the families
{u±m : m ≥ m0}
are equicontinuous (Lemma 5.2). The proof is based on a barrier ar-
gument. These results enable us to conclude by the Arzela`-Ascoli the-
orem, see Lemma 5.3, that there exists a continuous function u such
that
u±m(x, t)→ u(x, t), (1.13)
and that the limit u is the unique solution to (1.5).
Finally, at the end of Section 5, we prove Theorem 1.2 by showing
that, as the bounds on the controls increase, then a subsequence of
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corresponding value functions converge to a value function for the game
with unbounded controls. This, (1.12) and (1.13) yield the result.
Our approach is influenced by the works of Swiech [Swi96] as well as
Atar and Budhiraja [AB10]. A different approach to stochastic games
is due to Fleming and Souganidis [FS89], see also [BL08]. Indeed, the
approach in [FS89] is based on establishing a dynamic programming
principle based on careful approximation arguments, working directly
with the value functions. The authors then prove that the value func-
tions also solve the associated Bellman-Isaacs equations. However, our
model contains degenerate diffusion and unbounded controls, and our
approach relies on viscosity theory for non-linear and degenerate par-
tial differential equations already from the beginning. In particular,
instead of establishing a dynamic programming principle for the value
function, we show, as explained above, that the unique viscosity so-
lution to the corresponding partial differential equation satisfies a dy-
namic programming principle.
Our work is developed based on the recently established connections
between discrete time tug-of-war games and infinity harmonic func-
tions [PSSW09], and tug-of-war games with noise in the context of p-
harmonic functions [PS08]. Here, we also mention the approach based
on non-linear mean value formulas developed in [MPR10] and [MPR12].
Continuous time stochastic differential games and infinity harmonic
functions were considered in [AB10], and [AB11]. The equation con-
sidered in this paper coincides, modulo the presence of the model re-
lated constants and a change of the time direction, with the normal-
ized p-Laplace operator considered in [MPR10], in connection with
normalized p-parabolic equations and tug-of-war games, see also [BG]
and [Doe11]. The parabolic equation involving a normalized infinity
Laplacian is studied in [JK06].
2. Preliminaries
Recall that (Ω,F, {Fs},P) denotes a complete filtered probability
space with a right-continuous filtration supporting a (n+1)-dimensional
and {Fs}-adapted Brownian motion W = (W1, ...,Wn+1). We assume
that all components are standard independent Brownian motions.
Definition 2.1 (Controls). Let
A := A(s) := (θ(s), d(s))
be a progressively measurable stochastic process on (Ω,F, {Fs},P) tak-
ing values in H = Sn−1 × [0,∞). Then A is called a control. We set
Λ := Λ(A) := sup
ω∈Ω
sup
s∈[0,T ]
d(s, ω) ∈ [0,∞].
The control A is said to be admissible provided Λ <∞, and we denote
the set of all admissible controls by AC.
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Definition 2.2 (Strategies). A strategy is a mapping
ρ : AC→ AC
such that if
P(A(s) = A˜(s) for a.e. s ∈ [0, τ ]) = 1 and Λ(A) = Λ(A˜)
then
P(A′(s) = A˜′(s) for a.e. s ∈ [0, τ ]) = 1 and Λ(A′) = Λ(A˜′)
for every τ ∈ [0, T ], where A′ := ρ(A), A˜′ := ρ(A˜). Given a strategy ρ,
we set
Λ(ρ) := sup
A∈AC
Λ(ρ(A)) ∈ [0,∞].
A strategy is said to be admissible provided Λ(ρ) <∞, and we denote
the set of all admissible strategies by S.
In general, below we will consider controls which depend on the
current location X(t). Furthermore, for brevity, we drop the word
’admissible’ from now on. Later, we will approximate controls and
strategies by uniformly bounded ones.
Definition 2.3. For m ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, we define
ACm := {A ∈ AC : Λ(A) ≤ m},
Sm := {ρ ∈ S : Λ(ρ) ≤ m}. (2.1)
Definition 2.4. The upper and lower values of the underlying sto-
chastic dynamic game, with controls in ACm and strategies in Sm, are
defined as
U+m(x, t) = sup
ρ+∈Sm
inf
A−∈ACm
J (x,t)(ρ+(A−), A−),
U−m(x, t) = inf
ρ−∈Sm
sup
A+∈ACm
J (x,t)(A+, ρ−(A+)).
2.1. Bellman-Isaacs equations with bounded action sets: vis-
cosity solutions. Let Σ = diag(σ1, . . . , σn) and let M(n) denote the
set of all symmetric n × n-dimensional matrices. Given a matrix,
or vector M , we let M ′ denote the transpose of M . We define Φ :
S
n−1 × Sn−1 × R+ × R+ × Rn ×M(n)→ R through
Φ(θ+, θ−, d+, d−, p,M)
=− 1
2
(θ+ − θ−)′ΣMΣ(θ+ − θ−)
− 1
2
trace(Σ2M)− (d+ + d−)(θ+ + θ−) · p− µ · p.
Let LSC(Rn × [0, T ]) be the set of lower semi-continuous functions,
i.e. all functions
f : (Rn × [0, T ])→ R ∪ {∞}
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such that
lim inf
(y,s)→(x,t)
f(y, s) ≥ f(x, t).
Let USC(Rn × [0, T ]) be the set of upper semi-continuous functions,
i.e. all functions
f : (Rn × [0, T ])→ R ∪ {−∞}
such that
lim sup
(y,s)→(x,t)
f(y, s) ≤ f(x, t).
We define LSCl(R
n×[0, T ]) to consist of functions h ∈ LSC(Rn×[0, T ])
which satisfy the (linear) growth condition
|h(x, t)| ≤ c(1 + |x|) (2.2)
and for some c ∈ [1,∞). The space USCl(Rn × [0, T ]) is defined anal-
ogously. Furthermore,
Cl(R
n × [0, T ]) = USCl(Rn × [0, T ]) ∩ LSCl(Rn × [0, T ]).
In addition, ignoring t we define Cl(R
n) by analogy. Finally, C1,2(Rn×
[0, T ]) denotes the space of functions that are once continuously differ-
entiable in time and twice continuously differentiable in space.
Given m ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, we let
Hm = {(θ, d) ∈ H : d ≤ m},
and we define H˜+m, H˜
−
m : R
n ×M(n)→ R through
H˜+m(p,M) = sup
(θ−,d−)∈Hm
inf
(θ+,d+)∈Hm
Φ(θ+, θ−, d+, d−, p,M),
H˜−m(p,M) = inf
(θ+,d+)∈Hm
sup
(θ−,d−)∈Hm
Φ(θ+, θ−, d+, d−, p,M).
We define H+m, H
−
m : R× Rn ×M(n)→ R through
H+m(ξ, p,M) = H˜
+
m(p,M) + rξ,
H−m(ξ, p,M) = H˜
−
m(p,M) + rξ. (2.3)
Next, we introduce terminal value problems involving Bellman-Isaacs
type equations associated to the game with bounded controls.
∂tu−H+m(u,Du,D2u) = 0 in Rn × (0, T ),
u(x, T ) = g(x) on Rn, (2.4)
∂tu−H−m(u,Du,D2u) = 0 in Rn × (0, T ),
u(x, T ) = g(x) on Rn. (2.5)
A suitable concept of solution to the above equations is the notion of
viscosity solutions. Recall our standing assumption (1.6) for g.
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Definition 2.5. (a) A function u¯+m ∈ LSCl(Rn × [0, T ]) is a viscosity
supersolution to (2.4) if u¯+m(x, T ) ≥ g(x) for all x ∈ Rn and if
the following holds. If (x0, t0) ∈ Rn × (0, T ) and we have φ ∈
C1,2(Rn × [0, T ]) such that
(i) u¯+m(x0, t0) = φ(x0, t0),
(ii) u¯+m(x, t) > φ(x, t) for (x, t) 6= (x0, t0),
then
∂tφ(x0, t0) ≤ H+m(u¯+m(x0, t0), Dφ(x0, t0), D2φ(x0, t0)).
(b) A function u+m ∈ USCl(Rn × [0, T ]) is a viscosity subsolution to
(2.4) if u+m(x, T ) ≤ g(x) for all x ∈ Rn and if the following holds. If
(x0, t0) ∈ Rn × (0, T ) and we have φ ∈ C1,2(Rn × [0, T ]) such that
(i) u+m(x0, t0) = φ(x0, t0),
(ii) u+m(x, t) < φ(x, t) for (x, t) 6= (x0, t0),
then
∂tφ(x0, t0) ≥ H+m(u+m(x0, t0), Dφ(x0, t0), D2φ(x0, t0)).
(c) If um is both a viscosity supersolution and a viscosity subsolution
to (2.4), then um is a viscosity solution to (2.4).
(d) The definitions for the equation (2.5) are analogous with H+m, u¯
+
m,
u+m replaced by H
−
m, u¯
−
m, u
−
m.
Remark 2.6. Note that H+m(u, p,X) is continuous with respect to u, p,X
also when p = 0. In addition, H+m is degenerate elliptic in the sense
that
H+m(u, p,X) ≤ H+m(u, p, Y ), (2.6)
whenever X ≥ Y . The analogous statements hold for H−m(u, p,X).
2.2. Bellman-Isaacs equation with bounded action sets: exis-
tence and uniqueness of viscosity solutions.
Lemma 2.7. Let u+m, u¯
+
m ∈ Cl(Rn×[0, T ]) and u−m, u¯−m ∈ Cl(Rn×[0, T ]),
be viscosity sub- and supersolutions to (2.4) and (2.5), respectively.
Then,
u−m ≤ u¯−m and u+m ≤ u¯+m.
For the proof of the above comparison principle, see [GGIS91], in
particular see the argument starting from page 27 in [GGIS91]. Sim-
ilarly, by comparison with a sufficiently large constant it follows that
solutions are not merely of linear growth: they are bounded.
Lemma 2.8. Let y ∈ Rn and let L be the Lipschitz constant of g.
Consider 0 < ε≪ 1, and let
w¯(x, t) = g(y) +
A
ε2
(T − t) + 2L(|x− y|2 + ε)1/2,
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w(x, t) = g(y)− A
ε2
(T − t)− 2L(|x− y|2 + ε)1/2.
Then we can choose A, independent of y, ε and m, so that w¯ and w
are viscosity super- and subsolutions to (2.4) and (2.5).
Proof. We only prove the result for (2.4) as the proof for (2.5) is anal-
ogous. First, we immediately see that
w(x, T ) ≤ g(x) ≤ w¯(x, T ),
whenever x ∈ Rn. To prove that w¯ is a viscosity supersolution to (2.4)
we need to verify that
∂tw¯(x, t)−H+m(w¯(x, t), Dw¯(x, t), D2w¯(x, t)) ≤ 0,
whenever (x, t) ∈ Rn × [0, T ]. In the following, we split
Φ := Φ(θ+, θ−, d+, d−, Dw¯,D2w¯)
into
Φ = Φ1 + Φ2, (2.7)
where
Φ1 := −1
2
(θ+ − θ−)′ΣD2w¯Σ(θ+ − θ−)
− 1
2
trace(Σ2D2w¯)− µ ·Dw¯,
Φ2 := −(d+ + d−)(θ+ + θ−) ·Dw¯.
By a straightforward calculation, we see that
|Φ1| ≤ cL(|x− y|2 + ε)−1/2, (2.8)
for all (θ−, d−) ∈ Hm, (θ+, d+) ∈ Hm, and for some c independent of
y, L, m and ε. In particular, there is no m dependence as d± plays no
explicit role in Φ1.
We next estimate
sup
(θ−,d−)∈Hm
inf
(θ+,d+)∈Hm
Φ2
= 2L sup
(θ−,d−)∈Hm
inf
(θ+,d+)∈Hm
(
− (d+ + d−)(θ+ + θ−) · (x− y)
(|x− y|2 + ε)1/2
)
.
We can, without loss of generality, assume that x 6= y. Let θ− =
−(x− y)/|x− y| and note that
−(d+ + d−)(θ+ + θ−) · (x− y)
(|x− y|2 + ε)1/2 ≥ 0.
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Combining this estimate and (2.8) with (2.7), recalling the term−rw(x, t),
we see that
w¯t(x, t)−H+m(w¯(x, t), Dw¯(x, t), D2w¯(x, t))
≤ −A
ε2
+ cL(|x− y|2 + ε)−1/2
≤ −A
ε2
+ cLε−1/2,
whenever (x, t) ∈ Rn × [0, T ]. Hence, if we let A = 2cL ≥ cLε3/2 then
−Aε−2 + cLε−1/2 ≤ 0 and we can conclude that w¯ is a supersolution
to (2.4). The proof that w is a viscosity subsolution to (2.4) is almost
analogous. In particular, we first note that
−rw(x, t) = −r(g(y)− A
ε2
(T − t)− 2L(|x− y|2 + ε)1/2) ≥ −rg(y).
Then, observing that the right hand side is bounded, adjusting the
constants, and repeating the argument above we can conclude that w
is a subsolution. 
From now on we fix A so that w¯ and w are viscosity super- and
subsolutions, as stated in Lemma 2.8, to (2.4) and (2.5).
Lemma 2.9. If u+m and u
−
m are viscosity solutions to (2.4) and (2.5),
respectively, then
w ≤ u±m ≤ w¯.
Proof. The lemma is an immediate consequence of Lemma 2.8 and
Lemma 2.7. 
Lemma 2.10. There exist unique viscosity solutions u+m and u
−
m to
(2.4) and (2.5), respectively.
The proof of this result can be found in [Gig06] and it is based
on Perron’s method. Using this method, one constructs the so called
upper and lower Perron solutions by taking inf / sup over the suitable
super/subsolutions. That the constructed solutions assume the correct
terminal data can then be proved by using the above barriers.
3. Solving the stochastic dynamic game
with bounded action sets
The purpose of the section is to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Let u+m and u
−
m be the unique solutions to (2.4) and (2.5),
respectively, ensured by Lemma 2.10. Then,
u+m(x, t) = U
+
m(x, t) := sup
ρ+∈Sm
inf
A−∈ACm
J (x,t)(ρ+(A−), A−),
u−m(x, t) = U
−
m(x, t) := inf
ρ−∈Sm
sup
A+∈ACm
J (x,t)(A+, ρ−(A+)),
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whenever (x, t) ∈ Rn × [0, T ].
3.1. Proof of Lemma 3.1 assuming additional regularity on u±m.
We here prove Lemma 3.1 assuming smoothness on u+m and u
−
m.
Lemma 3.2. Let u+m and u
−
m be the unique solutions to (2.4) and
(2.5), respectively, ensured by Lemma 2.10. Assume, in addition, that
u±m, ∂tu
±
m, Du
±
m, D
2u±m, are Lipschitz continuous in R
n × [0, T ). Then
Lemma 3.1 holds.
Proof. The proof is based on the connection between solutions and
value functions provided by the Ito formula, in connection with suitable
discretized controls chosen based on the solution. The discretization
error can be estimated by utilizing the smoothness assumptions. At
the end, we pass to a limit with the discretization parameter. We only
supply the proof in the case of u−m, the proof for u
+
m being analogous.
Given k ∈ {1, 2, . . .} and (x, t) ∈ Rn × [0, T ], we can choose, as u−m
is a solution to (2.5), a control (θ+0 , d
+
0 ) ∈ Hm such that
sup
(θ−,d−)∈Hm
{
Φ(θ+0 , θ
−, d+0 , d
−, Du−m(x, t), D
2u−m(x, t)) + ru
−
m(x, t)
}
≤ ∂tu−m(x, t) + k−1.
(3.1)
Based on (θ+0 , d
+
0 ) = (θ
+
0,1, ...., θ
+
0,n, d
+
0 ) and an arbitrary, but fixed, con-
trol (θ−, d−) ∈ ACm, we let X0(s) := X0,(x,t)(s) be defined as in (1.2)
assuming also the initial condition X0(t) = x. In the following, we let
ΦX0 (s) : = Φ(θ
+
0 , θ
−(s), d+0 , d
−(s), Du−m(X
0(s), s), D2u−m(X
0(s), s)),
Φx0(s) : = Φ(θ
+
0 , θ
−(s), d+0 , d
−(s), Du−m(x, s), D
2u−m(x, s)).
As u−m, ∂tu
−
m, Du
−
m, D
2u−m are Lipschitz continuous in R
n × [0, T ), we
can apply the Ito formula to u−m(X
0(s), s) and
du−m(X
0(s), s) = ∂tu
−
m(X
0(s), s)ds+
n∑
i=1
∂xiu
−
m(X
0(s), s)dX0i (s)
+
1
2
n∑
i,j=1
∂xixju
−
m(X
0(s), s) dX0i (s) dX
0
j (s)
=(∂tu
−
m(X
0(s), s)− ΦX0 (s))ds
+
n∑
i=1
∂xiu
−
m(X
0(s), s)(σidWi(s) + σi(θ
+
0,i − θ−i (s))dWn+1(s)).
Using this
d(e−rsu−m(X
0(s), s))
=e−rs(∂tu
−
m(X
0(s), s)− ΦX0 (s)− ru−m(X0(s), s))ds
+ e−rs
n∑
i=1
∂xiu
−
m(X
0(s), s)(σidWi(s) + σi(θ
+
0,i − θ−i (s))dWn+1(s)).
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Hence, if we let ∆t = (T − t)/k, then
E[e−r(t+∆t)u−m(X
0(t +∆t), t+∆t))− e−rtu−m(X0(t), t)]
= E
[∫ t+∆t
t
e−rs(∂tu
−
m(X
0(s), s)− ΦX0 (s)− ru−m(X0(s), s))ds
]
,
and
u−m(x, t)
= E[e−r∆tu−m(X
0(t+∆t), t +∆t)] (3.2)
− E
[∫ t+∆t
t
e−r(s−t)(∂tu
−
m(X
0(s), s)− ΦX0 (s)− ru−m(X0(s), s))ds
]
.
We let
I1 = −E
[∫ t+∆t
t
e−r(s−t)(∂tu
−
m(X
0(s), s)− ∂tu−m(x, t))ds
]
,
I2 = −E
[∫ t+∆t
t
e−r(s−t)(Φx0(t)− ΦX0 (s))ds
]
,
I3 = −E
[∫ t+∆t
t
e−r(s−t)r(u−m(X
0(t), t))− u−m(X0(s), s))ds
]
.
(3.3)
Using this notation, we observe that
u−m(x, t)
= E[e−r∆tu−m(X
0(t +∆t), t+∆t)] + I1 + I2 + I3
− E
[∫ t+∆t
t
e−r(s−t)
(
∂tu
−
m(x, t)− Φx0(t)− ru−m(x, t)
)
ds
]
.
(3.4)
Next, using (3.1) we see that
−E
[∫ t+∆t
t
e−r(s−t)
(
∂tu
−
m(x, t)− Φx0(t)− ru−m(x, t)
)
ds
]
≤ k−1∆t.
(3.5)
Furthermore, by Lipschitz continuity of u−m, ∂tu
−
m, Du
−
m, D
2u−m, we can
conclude that
|I1|+ |I2|+ |I3| ≤ cE
[∫ t+∆t
t
(|X0(s)− x|+∆t)ds
]
≤ c(∆t)2 + cE
[∫ t+∆t
t
|X0(s)− x|ds
]
,
(3.6)
for some generic constant c. To estimate the expectation in the previous
estimate, we will have to use the equation satisfied by X0(s). Recall
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that
X0i (s)− xi =
∫ s
t
(
µi + (d
+
1 + d
−(τ))(θ+0,i + θ
−
i (τ))
)
dτ
+
∫ s
t
σidWi(τ) +
∫ s
t
σi(θ
+
0,i − θ−i (τ))dWn+1(τ).
Hence, simply using the Ho¨lder inequality and the Ito isometry, we see
that
E
[∫ t+∆t
t
|X0(s)− x|ds
]
=
[∫ t+∆t
t
E[|X0(s)− x|]ds
]
≤
[∫ t+∆t
t
(E[|X0(s)− x|2])1/2ds
]
≤ c(∆t)3/2,
and where c is allowed to depend on m defining the class ACm. Com-
bining the above estimates, we conclude that
|I1|+ |I2|+ |I3| ≤ c((∆t)2 + (∆t)3/2) ≤ c(∆t)3/2.
Hence returning to (3.2), also recalling (3.3) and (3.4), we see that
u−m(x, t) ≤ E[e−r∆tu−m(X0,(x,t)(t+∆t), t +∆t)]
+c(∆t)3/2 + k−1∆t, (3.7)
where ∆t = (T − t)/k.
We now use (3.7) in an iterative construction. Indeed, we let tj =
t+ j∆t for j = 0, ..., k− 1 and we first note, using (3.7), that for j = 0
we have
u−m(x, t0) ≤ E[e−r∆tu−m(X0,(x,t0)(t1), t1)]
+c(∆t)3/2 + k−1∆t.
We next consider j = 1. Then, using that u−m is a solution to (2.5),
that Hm is a separable metric space, and uniform continuity, it fol-
lows that there exist a sequence {(θ+1l, d+1l)}∞l=1 ⊂ Hm and a covering
{B(y1l, r1l)}∞l=1 of Rn, such that
sup
(θ−,d−)∈Hm
{
Φ(θ+1l, θ
−, d+1l, d
−, Du−m(y, t1), D
2u−m(y, t1)) + ru
−
m(y, t1)
}
≤ ∂tu−m(y, t1) + k−1 whenever y ∈ B(y1l, r1l).
We let ψ1 : R
n → Hm be defined as
ψ1(y) = (ψ
θ
1(y), ψ
d
1(y)) := (θ
+
1l, d
+
1l) if y ∈ B(y1l, r1l) \ ∪l−1i=1B(y1i, r1i).
Furthermore, this time we let
Φy1(s) := Φ(ψ
θ
1(y), θ
−, ψd1(y), d
−, Du−m(y, t1), D
2u−m(y, t1)).
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Then,
sup
(θ−,d−)∈Hm
{
Φy1(s) + ru
−
m(y, t1)
}
≤ ∂tu−m(y, t1) + k−1,
whenever y ∈ Rn. We now let
(θ+1 (s), d
+
1 (s)) = (θ
+
0 , d
+
0 ),
for s ∈ [t0, t1) = [t, t+∆t), and
(θ+1 (s), d
+
1 (s)) = (ψ
θ
1(X
0(t1)), ψ
d
1((X
0(t1))), (3.8)
for s ∈ [t1, t2) = [t + ∆t, t + 2∆t). In this way, we have constructed
a new control (θ+1 , d
+
1 ) ∈ ACm. Next, with this (θ+1 , d+1 ) ∈ ACm and
an arbitrary, but fixed, control (θ−, d−) ∈ ACm, we construct X1(s) =
X1,(x,t)(s) for s ∈ [t0, t2) satisfying the initial condition X1(t) = x and
the dynamics in (1.2). By construction, it follows that X1(s) = X0(s)
for s ∈ [t0, t1). We can now repeat the argument above to conclude
that
u−m(X
0(t1), t1) ≤ E[e−r∆tu−m(X1(t2), t2)|X0(t1)]
+c(∆t)3/2 + k−1∆t.
In particular, we see that
E[e−r∆tu−m(X
0(t1), t1)] ≤ E[e−2r∆tu−m(X1(t2), t2)] (3.9)
+c(∆t)3/2 + k−1∆t.
Combining this with (3.7), we conclude that
u−m(x, t) ≤ E[e−2r∆tu−m(X1(t2), t2)]
+c2(∆t)3/2 + 2k−1∆t.
By carefully iterating the above argument, we get a sequence of controls
(θ+j , d
+
j ) ∈ ACm, for j ∈ {0, 1, ..., k − 1}, and a sequence of processes
Xj(s) = Xj,(x,t)(s) based on the controls (θ+j , d
+
j ) and an arbitrary, but
fixed, (θ−, d−) ∈ ACm. In particular, we have
u−m(x, t) ≤ E[e−jr∆tu−m(Xj(tj), tj)]
+cj(∆t)3/2 + jk−1∆t,
for all j ∈ {1, ..., k}. Applying this inequality with j = k, we conclude
that
u−m(x, t) ≤ E[e−r(T−t)u−m(Xk(T ), T ))] + c(T − t)(∆t)1/2 +∆t
= E[e−r(T−t)g(Xk(T ))] + c(T − t)(∆t)1/2 +∆t, (3.10)
where we also used u−m(x, T ) = g(x) in the last line.
Summing up, given k ∈ {1, 2, . . .} and (x, t) ∈ Rn × [0, T ], we have
constructed controls (θ+k , d
+
k ) such that for an arbitrary, but fixed,
(θ−, d−) ∈ ACm, (3.10) holds with Xk defined as in (1.2) based on
(θ+k , d
+
k ), (θ
−, d−), and Xk(t) = x.
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Next, consider ρ− ∈ Sm. Based on the above argument, we now
construct (θ+j , d
+
j ) and (θ
−, d−)|[tj ,tj+1), j = 0, 1, ..., k − 1, using ρ−.
Indeed, given (x, t) ∈ Rn × [0, T ], we first let (θ+0 , d+0 ) be as above and
set
(θ−, d−)|[t0,t1) := ρ−(θ+0 , d+0 )|[t0,t1).
Then, having defined (θ−, d−)|[t0,t1), we may define (θ+1 , d+1 ) on [t0, t2)
as in (3.8). Repeating the above argument, we set
(θ−, d−)|[t1,t2) := ρ−(θ+1 , d+1 )|[t1,t2).
In particular, proceeding inductively, we can based on ρ− ∈ Sm con-
struct the controls (θ+k , d
+
k ) and (θ
−, d−) such that
u−m(x, t) ≤ E[e−r(T−t)g(Xk(T ))] + c(T − t)(∆t)1/2 +∆t
≤ sup
A+∈ACm
J (x,t)(A+, ρ−(A+))
+c(T − t)(∆t)1/2 +∆t,
for all k, ∆t = (T − t)/k, and for all ρ− ∈ Sm. Letting k →∞, we end
up with
u−m(x, t) ≤ inf
ρ−∈Sm
sup
A+∈ACm
J (x,t)(A+, ρ−(A+)). (3.11)
To prove the opposite inequality, we again note, as u−m is a solu-
tion to (2.5) and Φ is uniformly continuous, that we can choose, given
k ∈ {1, 2, . . .} and (x, t) ∈ Rn × [0, T ], a countable set of controls
{θ−1i, d−1i}i ⊂ Hm and a covering
{Brl(xl)× Br′l(θ+l , d+l )}l,
such that{
Φ(θ+, θ−1l, d
+, d−1l, Du
−
m(x, t), D
2u−m(x, t)) + ru
−
m(x, t)
}
≥ ∂tu−m(x, t)− k−1,
if (x, (θ+, d+)) ∈ Brl(xl)× Br′l(θ+l , d+l ). We define a map
ψ0(x, (θ
+, d+)) := (θ−1l, d
−
1l),
if (x, (θ+, d+)) ∈ Brl(xl)×Br′l(θ+l , d+l )\∪l−1i=1Bri(xi)×Br′i(θ+i , d+i ). Then,
by arguing as above, we deduce that we can construct controls such that
u−m(x, t) ≥ E[e−r(T−t)u−m(Xk(T ), T ))]− c(T − t)(∆t)1/2 −∆t
= E[e−r(T−t)g(Xk(T ))]− c(T − t)(∆t)1/2 −∆t, (3.12)
for an arbitrary, but fixed (θ+, d+) ∈ ACm. Here Xk is defined as in
(1.2), based on the controls above, and Xk(t) = x.
We can now use (θ−il , d
−
il ), i = 1, 2, . . . , k, constructed above to define
our strategy given (θ+, d+). In particular, using (3.12), we see that
u−m(x, t) ≥ J (x,t)(A+, ρ−k (A+))− c(T − t)(∆t)1/2 −∆t,
TUG-OF-WAR, MARKET MANIPULATION AND OPTION PRICING 21
and, hence
u−m(x, t) ≥ inf
ρ−∈Sm
J (x,t)(A+, ρ−(A+))
−c(T − t)(∆t)1/2 −∆t,
for all k, ∆t = (T − t)/k, and for all A+ ∈ ACm. In particular, letting
k →∞, we can conclude that
u−m(x, t) ≥ inf
ρ−∈Sm
sup
A+∈ACm
J (x,t)(A+, ρ−(A+)).
Combining this with (3.11), we see that the proof of Lemma 3.2 for u−m
is complete. 
3.2. Proof of Lemma 3.1. In the following, we only supply the proof
in the case of u−m in R
n×[0, T ], the proof for u+m being analogous. Given
a large non-negative integer j, we let Tj = T− 1j and Rnj := Rn× [1j , Tj ].
Given j fixed we introduce, for ǫ > 0 small, the sup-convolution
uε(x0, t0) := sup
(x,t)∈Rn×[0,T ]
{u−m(x, t)−
(t0 − t)2 + (x0 − x)2
2ε
},
whenever (x0, t0) ∈ Rnj . Then u−m(x0, t0) ≤ uε(x0, t0) whenever (x0, t0) ∈
Rnj and uε is a semi-convex function, i.e. there exists a constant c > 0
such that uε(x, t) + c(|x|2 + t2) is convex. Furthermore, provided ε is
small enough,
H−m(x, t,Duε, D
2uε) ≤ ∂tuε(x, t) + ω(ε),
for a.e. (x, t) ∈ Rnj and where ω(ε) is a bounded modulus which depends
on the continuity of u−m. For details and properties of sup-convolutions,
see for example [CIL92], [Ish95] and [Lin12].
Next, using the standing assumptions on g, see (1.6), and the com-
parison principle, we see that 0 ≤ u−m(x, t) ≤ L for all (x, t) ∈ Rn ×
[0, T ]. Furthermore, using the boundedness of u−m, it follows that the
supremum used in the definition of uε(x0, t0) is obtained at some point
(x∗, t∗). In particular,
0 ≤ u−m(x0, t0) ≤ uε(x0, t0) = u−m(x∗, t∗)−
(t0 − t∗)2 + (x0 − x∗)2
2ε
≤ L− (t0 − t
∗)2 + (x0 − x∗)2
2ε
,
and hence √
(t0 − t∗)2 + (x0 − x∗)2 ≤
√
2Lε,
where we deduce a condition
√
2Lε < 1/j for ε.
Given δ > 0 small, we let ηδ denote a standard mollifier in R
n+1.
Restricting δ ≪ ((j−1)−1− j−1)/2, we see that uδε(x, t) := uε ∗ηδ(x, t),
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the convolution of uε and ηδ, is well-defined whenever (x, t) ∈ Rnj−1.
Then,
uδε → uε, uniformly on Rnj−1,
Duδε → Duε, a.e. in Rnj−1,
∂tu
δ
ε → ∂tuε, a.e. in Rnj−1,
D2uδε → D2uε, a.e. in Rnj−1.
The last statement is based on Alexandrov’s theorem, see for example
Section 6 of [EG92] or [JJ12]. Furthermore,
H−m(x, t,Du
δ
ε, D
2uδε) ≤ ∂tuδε(x, t) + ω(ε) + γδ(x, t),
a.e. in Rnj−1 where γδ(x, t) → 0 as δ → 0, and γδ is uniformly con-
tinuous (this is a result for the standard convolution; the modulus of
continuity is not claimed to be uniform in δ) and bounded uniformly
in δ (recall uniform semiconvexity and uniform Lipschitz continuity of
uδε with respect to δ). Now, using that u
δ
ε, ∂tu
δ
ε, Du
δ
ε, D
2uδε are Lips-
chitz continuous in Rnj−1, we can argue as in the proof of Lemma 3.2
to conclude that
uδε(x, t) ≤ inf
ρ−∈Sm
sup
A+∈ACm
E
[∫ Tj−1
t
e−r(s−t)hδε(X(s), s) ds
+ e−r(Tj−1−t)uδε(X(Tj−1), Tj−1)
]
,
(3.13)
whenever (x, t) ∈ Rnj−1 and where hδε := ω(ε) + γδ. Using this, (3.1)
becomes
sup
(θ−,d−)∈Hm
{
Φ(θ+0 , θ
−, d+0 , d
−, Duδε(x, t), D
2uδε(x, t)) + ru
δ
ε(x, t)
}
≤ ∂tuδε(x, t) + hδε(x, t) + k−1,
for (x, t) ∈ Rnj−1, and thus, we may estimate the second term on the
right hand side of (3.2) by using hδε(x, t). In particular, in (3.5), the
expression ∂tu
−
m(x, t) − Φx0(t) − ru−m(x, t) may be replaced by hδε(x, t).
Using these observations, and arguing as in the proof of Lemma 3.2,
we see that (3.9) becomes
E[e−r∆tuεδ(X
0(t1), t1)] ≤ E[e−2r∆tuεδ(X1(t2), t2)]
− E[
∫ t2
t1
e−r(s−t)hδε(X
1(s), s) ds] + c(∆t)3/2 + k−1∆t + c∆tρ(∆t),
where ∆t = (Tj−1 − t)/k, the modulus of continuity ρ in the last error
term depends on the modulus of continuity of hδε, and results from
the calculations similar to those following (3.6), except that we use ρ
instead of |·|. Iterating the above reasoning in time, along the lines of
the proof of Lemma 3.2, completes the argument. In particular, the
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last error term yields c(Tj−1 − t)ρ((Tj−1 − t)/k). Then, letting k →∞
(3.13) follows.
Next, we want, for j fixed, to let δ → 0 and ε → 0 in (3.13).
To do this, recall that the underlying dynamics X is defined through
the stochastic differential equation in (1.2) and based on (uniformly)
bounded controls encoded through Sm and ACm. In particular, X
solves a SDE with (uniformly) bounded coefficients. Using this, and a
standard martingale argument, we first observe that there exists, for
θ > 0 given, R = Rθ such that
P( sup
t≤s≤Tj−1
|X(s)| ≥ R) ≤ θ. (3.14)
Furthermore, given θ > 0 and R as above, we choose Ωθ ⊂ BR := BR(0)
such that |Ωθ| < θ and such that
γδ → 0 uniformly in (BR(0) \ Ωθ)× [(j − 1)−1, Tj−1] as δ → 0.(3.15)
Given E ⊂ Rn, we let χE denote the indicator function for E in the
following. Then, first using (3.14), we see that∫ Tj−1
t
E[e−r(s−t)hδε(X(s), s)] ds
≤
∫ Tj
t
E[hδε(X(s), s)χBR(X(s))] ds+
∫ Tj
t
E[hδε(X(s), s)χBcR(X(s))] ds
≤ Iε,δ1 (θ) + Iε,δ2 (θ) + c(Tj−1 − t)θ,
for some harmless constant independent of j, ε, δ, and θ. Here
Iε,δ1 (θ) :=
∫ Tj−1
t
E[hδε(X(s), s)χΩθ(X(s))] ds,
Iε,δ2 (θ) :=
∫ Tj−1
t
E[hδε(X(s), s)χBR\Ωθ(X(s))] ds.
Now
Iε,δ1 (θ) ≤ c
∫ Tj−1
t
E[χΩθ(X(s))] ds ≤ c(Tj−1 − t)|Ωθ|, (3.16)
and consequently
Iε,δ1 (θ) ≤ c(Tj−1 − t)θ,
for some constant c independent of ε, δ, θ. Note that the estimate in
(3.16) is far from straightforward. Indeed, (3.16) is a fundamental es-
timate by Krylov and stated as Theorem 4 on p.66 in [Kry09]. It is
interesting to note that there is, at the core of Krylov’s proof of this
estimate, a Alexandrov-Bakelman-Pucci-type estimate for uniformly
parabolic equations, see Krylov [Kry76]. In particular, a short calcula-
tion shows that our dynamics satisfies the sufficient assumptions stated
in [Kry09] for the validity of the estimate in (3.16).
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Next, we note that
Iε,δ2 (θ)→ 0 when we first let δ → 0, and then ε→ 0,
as we see from the fact that hδε = ω(ε) + γδ, (3.15), and that ω(ε)→ 0
as ε→ 0.
Taking the limits δ → 0 and ε → 0 in (3.13), we see by the above
that
u(x, t) ≤ inf
ρ−∈Sm
sup
A+∈ACm
E[e−r(Tj−1−t)u(X(Tj−1), Tj−1)],
whenever (x, t) ∈ Rnj−1. Finally, using the barriers given by Lemma
2.9, and by arguing as at the end of the proof of Lemma 5.2 stated
below, we can conclude that
u(x, t) ≤ inf
ρ−∈Sm
sup
A+∈ACm
E[e−r(T−t)g(X(T ))],
by letting j →∞. This completes the proof of Lemma 3.1. ✷
4. The limit equation ∂tu+ F (u,Du,D
2u) = 0
We here start by introducing the relevant notion of viscosity super-
and subsolutions to (1.5).
Definition 4.1. (a) A function u¯ ∈ LSCl(Rn × [0, T ]) is a viscosity
supersolution to (1.5) if u¯(x, T ) ≥ g(x) for all x ∈ Rn and if the
following holds. If (x0, t0) ∈ Rn × (0, T ) and we have φ ∈ C1,2(Rn ×
[0, T ]) such that
(i) u¯(x0, t0) = φ(x0, t0),
(ii) u¯(x, t) > φ(x, t) for (x, t) 6= (x0, t0),
then
0 ≥ ∂tφ(x0, t0) + F (u¯(x0, t0), Dφ(x0, t0), D2φ(x0, t0)), (4.1)
whenever Dφ(x0, t0) 6= 0, and
0 ≥ ∂tφ(x0, t0) + lim inf
p→0
F (u¯(x0, t0), p,D
2φ(x0, t0)), (4.2)
whenever Dφ(x0, t0) = 0.
(b) A function u ∈ USCl(Rn × [0, T ]) is a viscosity subsolution to
(1.5) if u(x, T ) ≤ g(x) for all x ∈ Rn and if the following holds. If
(x0, t0) ∈ Rn × (0, T ) and we have φ ∈ C1,2(Rn × [0, T ]) such that
(i) u(x0, t0) = φ(x0, t0),
(ii) u(x, t) < φ(x, t) for (x, t) 6= (x0, t0),
then
0 ≤ ∂tφ(x0, t0) + F (u(x0, t0), Dφ(x0, t0), D2φ(x0, t0)), (4.3)
whenever Dφ(x0, t0) 6= 0, and
0 ≤ ∂tφ(x0, t0) + lim sup
p→0
F (u(x0, t0), p,D
2φ(x0, t0)), (4.4)
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whenever Dφ(x0, t0) = 0.
(c) If u is both a viscosity supersolution and a viscosity subsolution to
(1.5), then u is a viscosity solution to (1.5).
We let
F ∗ := lim sup
p→0
F and F∗ := lim inf
p→0
F.
Using this notation, we see that (4.1) and (4.2) can be written at once
as
0 ≥ ∂tφ(x0, t0) + F∗(u¯(x0, t0), Dφ(x0, t0), D2φ(x0, t0)),
and (4.3) and (4.4) as
0 ≤ ∂tφ(x0, t0) + F ∗(u(x0, t0), Dφ(x0, t0), D2φ(x0, t0)).
Similarly to Lemma 2.7, the following lemma also follows from [GGIS91].
Lemma 4.2. Let u, u¯ ∈ Cl(Rn × [0, T ]) be viscosity sub- and superso-
lutions to (1.5) in the sense of Definition 4.1. Then,
u(x, t) ≤ u¯(x, t),
whenever (x, t) ∈ Rn × [0, T ].
Furthermore, arguing as in Lemma 2.8 and Lemma 2.9, we see that
we can construct barriers to (1.5), use them for comparison, and prove
the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3. Let y ∈ Rn and let L be the Lipschitz constant of g.
Consider 0 < ε≪ 1, and let
w¯(x, t) = g(y) +
A
ε2
(T − t) + 2L(|x− y|2 + ε)1/2,
w(x, t) = g(y)− A
ε2
(T − t)− 2L(|x− y|2 + ε)1/2.
Then, we can choose A, independent of y, ε and m, so that w¯ and w
are viscosity super- and subsolutions to (1.5). Consequently, for such
A, and if u is a viscosity solution to (1.5), we have
w ≤ u ≤ w¯.
Below, we always choose, when applying w¯ and w, A so that Lemma
4.3 holds.
Theorem 4.4. There exists a unique viscosity solution u to (1.5).
The uniqueness part of Theorem 4.4 follows from Lemma 4.2. The
existence part of Theorem 4.4 again follows from Perron’s method, also
using Lemma 4.3 as discussed after Lemma 2.10.
Next, using a modification of the techniques [CGG91], [ES91], see
also [JK06] and [KMP12], we prove the following lemma which states
that the set of test functions used in Definition 4.1 can be reduced. We
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consider continuous sub-/supersolutions as we later will only need this
result for solutions.
Lemma 4.5. Let u ∈ Cl(Rn × [0, T ]). Then, to test whether or not
u is a viscosity super- or subsolution at (x0, t0) in the sense of Defini-
tion 4.1, it is enough to consider test functions φ ∈ C1,2(Rn × [0, T ])
such that either
(i) Dφ(x0, t0) 6= 0 or
(ii) Dφ(x0, t0) = 0 and D
2φ(x0, t0) = 0.
Proof. We here only prove the lemma in the context of subsolutions.
The proof is by contradiction. Indeed, assume that there exists a func-
tion u ∈ Cl(Rn × [0, T ]), which fails to be a subsolution at (x0, t0)
in the sense of Definition 4.1 even though the following holds. If
(x0, t0) ∈ Rn × (0, T ) and φ ∈ C1,2(Rn × [0, T ]) are such that
(i) u(x0, t0) = φ(x0, t0),
(ii) u(x, t) < φ(x, t) for (x, t) 6= (x0, t0),
then
0 ≤ ∂tφ(x0, t0) + F ∗(u(x0, t0), Dφ(x0, t0), D2φ(x0, t0)), (4.5)
whenever
(i) Dφ(x0, t0) 6= 0 or
(ii) Dφ(x0, t0) = 0 and D
2φ(x0, t0) = 0.
Using that u is assumed to fail to be a subsolution, we see that there
must also exist a test function ϕ touching from above, and ε > 0, such
that
0 > ∂tϕ(x0, t0) + F
∗(u(x0, t0), Dϕ(x0, t0), D
2ϕ(x0, t0)) + ε, (4.6)
and such that
Dϕ(x0, t0) = 0 and D
2ϕ(x0, t0) 6= 0.
In addition, we may assume that u − ϕ has a strict global maximum
at (x0, t0). Let
w(x, t, y, s) := wj(x, t, y, s) = u(x, t)− ϕ(y, s)−Ψj(x, t, y, s), (4.7)
where
Ψ(x, t, y, s) := Ψj(x, t, y, s) =
j
4
|x− y|4 + j
2
(t− s)2.
By comparison and the structure of the barriers in Lemma 4.3, we see
that there exists (xj , tj, yj, sj) ∈ Rn × (0, T )× Rn × (0, T ) such that
w(xj, tj , yj, sj) = sup
(x,t,y,s)∈Rn×[0,T ]×Rn×[0,T ]
w(x, t, y, s). (4.8)
Furthermore,
(xj , tj, yj, sj)→ (x0, t0, x0, t0) as j →∞.
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We now consider two cases.
Case 1: there exists an infinite sequence of j:s such that xj = yj for
each such j.
Case 2: there exists an j0 ∈ {1, 2, . . .} such that xj 6= yj for all j,
j > j0.
We first analyze Case 1 and we let xj = yj. Then, by construction,
u(x, t) ≤ u(xj, tj) + ϕ(y, s)− ϕ(yj, sj)
+Ψ(x, t, y, s)−Ψ(xj , tj, yj, sj),
whenever (x, t, y, s) ∈ Rn × [0, T ]× Rn × [0, T ]. In particular,
u(x, t) ≤ u(xj , tj) + Ψ(x, t, yj, sj)−Ψ(xj , tj, yj, sj), (4.9)
whenever (x, t) ∈ Rn × (0, T ). Moreover, as xj = yj, we observe that
DxΨ(xj , tj, yj, sj) = 0, D
2
xxΨ(xj , tj, yj, sj) = 0, and thus, we can con-
clude that the function on the right in (4.9) is an admissible test func-
tion at (xj , tj) for the conclusion in (4.5). For brevity, we drop the
arguments (xj, tj , yj, sj) in Ψ and its derivatives in the displays below.
We have
0 ≤ Ψt + F ∗(u(xj, tj), DxΨ, D2xxΨ).
Using that (y, s) 7→ ϕ(y, s) + Ψ(xj , tj, y, s) has a local minimum at
(yj, sj) by (4.8), we observe that 0 = −D2yyΨ ≤ D2ϕ(yj, sj), 0 =
−DyΨ = Dϕ(yj, sj) and −Ψs = ∂tϕ(yj, sj). By these facts, ellipticity
of F ∗, and (4.6) it follows that
Ψs = −∂tϕ(yj, sj) > F ∗(u(yj, sj),−DyΨ,−D2yyΨ) +
ε
2
.
Combining the previous two displays, we obtain
r(u(xj, tj)− u(yj, sj)) < j
(
(tj − sj)− (tj − sj)
)− ε
2
= −ε
2
,
which is a a contradiction for large enough j as u is continuous.
We next analyze Case 2. In this case, using the Theorem of sums,
see [CIL92], we see that there exist (Ψt, DxΨ, X) ∈ P2,+u(x, t) and
(−Ψs,−DyΨ,−Y ) ∈ P2,−ϕ(y, t) such that X ≤ −Y . In particular, as
DxΨ 6= 0 it follows that
0 ≤ Ψt + F ∗(u(xj , tj), DxΨ, X)
0 > −Ψs + F ∗(u(yj, sj),−DyΨ,−Y ) + ε
2
,
(4.10)
where the second inequality follows from (4.6). Thus
Ψt +Ψs > −F ∗(u(xj , tj), DxΨ, X) + F ∗(u(yj, sj),−DyΨ,−Y ) + ε
2
≥ ε
2
+ r(u(yj, sj)− u(xj , tj)).
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Finally, observing that Ψt = −Ψs, we see that the last display implies
that
0 ≥ ε
2
+ r(u(yj, sj)− u(xj, tj)),
and this now produces a contradiction for j large enough. The proof
for a supersolution is similar. 
5. Going to the limit: general action sets as m→∞
In the following we will use the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1. Let ξm, ξ ∈ R, pm, p ∈ Rn \{0}, Mm,M ∈M(n), be such
that
ξm → ξ, pm → p, and Mm →M,
as m→∞. Then,
H±m(ξm, pm,Mm)→ −F (ξ, p,M).
Proof. We here only prove the statement for H−m, the proof for H
+
m
being analogous. To prove that
H−m(ξm, pm,Mm)→ −F (ξ, p,M)
it suffices to consider those terms in H−m which are sensitive to
inf
(θ+,d+)∈Hm
sup
(θ−,d−)∈Hm
.
In particular, we focus on
Φ˜(θ+, θ−, d+, d−, pm,Mm) := −1
2
(θ+ − θ−)′ΣMmΣ(θ+ − θ−)
−(d+ + d−)(θ+ + θ−) · pm.
Setting
Φ˜m := inf
(θ+,d+)∈Hm
sup
(θ−,d−)∈Hm
Φ˜,
we observe that
Φ˜m ≤ sup
(θ−,d−)∈Hm
(
− 1
2
(pm/|pm| − θ−)′ΣMmΣ(pm/|pm| − θ−)
− d−(pm/|pm|+ θ−) · pm
)
,
and that (pm/|pm| + θ−) · pm ≥ 0 whenever θ− ∈ Sn−1. In particular,
we conclude that Φ˜m is bounded from above as m→∞.
Using that the set {(θ+, d+) ∈ Hm} is compact, we see that there
exists a (θ+m, d
+
m) realizing the infimum in the definition of Φ˜m. We will
prove that there exists, given ε > 0, m0 = m0(ε) such that
|pm| − ε ≤ θ+m · pm ≤ |pm| whenever m ≥ m0. (5.1)
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Obviously, we only have to establish the lower bound and to do this
we assume, on the contrary, that there exists ε > 0 and mj →∞, such
that
θ+mj · pmj ≤ |pmj | − ε as j →∞. (5.2)
If this is the case, then
Φ˜mj = sup
(θ−,d−)∈Hmj
(
−1
2
(θ+mj − θ−)′ΣMmjΣ(θ+mj − θ−)
− (d+mj + d−)(θ+mj + θ−) · pmj
)
≥ −c− (d+mj +mj)(θ+mj − pmj/|pmj |) · pmj
≥ −c + (d+mj +mj)ε,
(5.3)
as (−pmj/|pmj |, mj) ∈ Hmj and for some harmless constant c. However,
(5.3) contradicts the boundedness of Φ˜mj asmj →∞, hence (5.2) must
be false and (5.1) must hold.
Using (5.1) we see that
θ+m → p/|p| as m→∞. (5.4)
Furthermore, using that
Φ˜m ≥ −1
2
(θ+m + pm/|pm|)′ΣMmΣ(θ+m + pm/|pm|)
− (d+m +m)(θ+m − pm/|pm|) · pm
≥ −1
2
(θ+m + pm/|pm|)′ΣMmΣ(θ+m + pm/|pm|),
in combination with (5.4), we have that
lim inf
m→∞
Φ˜m ≥ −2(p/|p|)′ΣMΣp/|p|. (5.5)
This yields, recalling the rest of the terms in the definition of H−m, that
lim inf
m→∞
H−m(ξm, pm,Mm) ≥ −F (ξ, p,M).
To complete the proof it only remains to prove that
lim sup
m→∞
H−m(ξm, pm,Mm) ≤ −F (ξ, p,M). (5.6)
To do this, we first note, again using the definition of (θ+m, d
+
m), that
Φ˜m = sup
(θ−,d−)∈Hm
Φ˜(θ+m, θ
−, d+m, d
−, pm,Mm)
≤ sup
(θ−,d−)∈Hm
Φ˜(pm/|pm|, θ−, m, d−, pm,Mm).
Furthermore, using compactness, we see that we can choose (θ−m, d
−
m)
realizing the supremum in the last display. Hence,
Φ˜m ≤ −1
2
(pm/|pm| − θ−m)′ΣMmΣ(pm/|pm| − θ−m)
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−(m+ d−m)(pm/|pm|+ θ−m) · pm.
Using this we deduce that θ−m → −p/|p|, as otherwise the above esti-
mate would imply lim infm→∞ Φ˜m = −∞ contradicting (5.5). Further-
more,
Φ˜m ≤− 1
2
(pm/|pm| − θ−m)′ΣMmΣ(pm/|pm| − θ−m)
− (m+ d−m)(pm/|pm|+ θ−m) · pm
≤− 1
2
(pm/|pm| − θ−m)′ΣMmΣ(pm/|pm| − θ−m),
and taking lim supm→∞, we see that (5.6) holds. This completes the
proof of the lemma. 
Lemma 5.2. Let u+m and u
−
m be the unique solutions to (2.4) and (2.5),
respectively, ensured by Lemma 2.10. Then, there existsm0 ∈ {1, 2, . . .}
such that the families
{u±m : m ≥ m0}
are equicontinuous on Rn × [0, T ].
Proof. We here only prove that {u+m : m ≥ m0} is equicontinuous on
Rn × [0, T ], the proof for {u−m : m ≥ m0} being analogous. Using
Lemma 3.1 we have that
u+m(x, t) = U
+
m(x, t) := sup
ρ+∈Sm
inf
A−∈ACm
J (x,t)(ρ+(A−), A−),
whenever (x, t) ∈ Rn × [0, T ]. Note that we can use both a stochastic
as well as a PDE point of view to prove the lemma. Furthermore, the
processes underlying the stochastic formulation, see (1.2), all end at
T . Suppose that we consider two games, one starting from (x1, t1) and
one starting from (x2, t2) with t1 < t2. We want to show, uniformly in
m, that |u+m(x1, t1) − u+m(x2, t2)| can be made arbitrary small by con-
sidering (x1, t1) and (x2, t2) sufficiently close. Using that the controls
and strategies always can be ’copied’ for the processes starting from
(x1, t1), (x2, t2), cf. p. 105 [PS08], and by considering same samples,
this is possible as we use space and time independent Brownian mo-
tions, we see that it is enough to consider points (x1, t1) and (x2, T )
with t1 < T . In particular, given δ > 0, we now want to prove that
there exists η > 0 such that
|u+m(x1, t1)− u+m(x2, T )| = |u+m(x1, t1)− g(x2)| ≤ δ
whenever |x1 − x2|+ T − t1 ≤ η. Recall the barriers
w¯(x, t) = g(x2) +
A
ε2
(T − t) + 2M(|x− x2|2 + ε)1/2,
w(x, t) = g(x2)− A
ε2
(T − t)− 2M(|x− x2|2 + ε)1/2.
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Using Lemma 2.9, we have
w ≤ u+m ≤ w¯.
In particular,
|u+m(x1, t)− g(x2)| ≤
A
ε2
(T − t) + 2M(|x1 − x2|2 + ε)1/2.
Let |x1 − x2|+ T − t1 ≤ ε5/2. Then, for ε < 1
|u+m(x1, t1)− g(x2)| ≤ Aε1/2 + 4Mε1/2 ≤ (A+ 4M)ε1/2,
and we conclude, by choosing ε small enough. This completes the
proof. 
Lemma 5.3. Let u+m and u
−
m be the unique solutions to (2.4) and (2.5),
respectively. Then,
u±m(x, t)→ u(x, t),
for all (x, t) ∈ Rn × [0, T ], where u is the continuous, unique viscosity
solution to (1.5).
Proof. We again only prove the result for u+m, the proof for u
−
m being
similar. We first recall that the existence of u+m is ensured by Lemma
2.10. Furthermore, by comparison with a supersolution L, we see that
the sequence {u+m} is uniformly bounded in Rn× [0, T ]. Using this and
Lemma 5.2, we can first conclude, using the Arzela`-Ascoli theorem,
that there exists u, continuous on Rn × [0, T ], such that
u+m(x, t)→ u(x, t) as m→∞. (5.7)
We next prove that u is a viscosity subsolution in Rn×[0, T ) to (1.5).
To do this, let φ ∈ C2 touch u strictly from above at (x0, t0). Then,
using the uniform convergence it follows that there exists (xm, tm) →
(x0, t0) such that
u+m − φ
has a strict max at (xm, tm). Hence
∂tφ(xm, tm) ≥ H+m(u+m(xm, tm), Dφ(xm, tm), D2φ(xm, tm)). (5.8)
Note that, as m → ∞, ∂tφ(xm, tm) → ∂tφ(x0, t0), u+m(xm, tm) →
u(x0, t0), Dφ(xm, tm) → Dφ(x0, t0), D2φ(xm, tm) → D2φ(x0, t0), and
we want to pass to the limit in (5.8). Suppose first that Dφ(x0, t0) 6= 0.
Then, using Lemma 5.1 we see that
H+m(u
+
m(xm, tm),Dφ(xm, tm), D
2φ(xm, tm))
→ −F (u(x0, t0), Dφ(x0, t0), D2φ(x0, t0)),
asm→∞. Next, suppose that Dφ(x0, t0) = 0. In this case, we can, by
Lemma 4.5, also assume, without loss of generality, that D2φ(x0, t0) =
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0. But in this case
H+m(u
+
m(xm, tm),Dφ(xm, tm), D
2φ(xm, tm))
→ −F ∗(u(x0, t0), 0, 0).
In particular, in either case, we can conclude that
∂tφ(x0, t0) ≥ −F ∗(u(x0, t0), Dφ(x0, t0), D2φ(x0, t0)). (5.9)
and hence u is a continuous viscosity subsolution to (1.5). The proof
of the result that u is also a supersolution to (1.5) is similar. We omit
further details. 
We are in position to prove the main result of the paper, Theorem
1.2, which states that the game with unbounded controls has a value
and that the value function
u = U+(x, t) = sup
ρ+∈S
inf
A−∈AC
J (x,t)(ρ+(A−), A−)
= inf
ρ−∈S
sup
A+∈AC
J (x,t)(A+, ρ−(A+)) = U−(x, t),
is the unique solution u to (1.5).
Proof of Theorem 1.2. We will here only prove that u = U− as the
proof is analogously in the other case. Recall that Lemma 3.1 states
that
u−m(x, t) = U
−
m(x, t) = inf
ρ−∈Sm
sup
A+∈ACm
J (x,t)(A+, ρ−(A+)).
Furthermore, using Lemma 5.3 we have
u−m(x, t)→ u(x, t),
where u is the solution to (1.5). Thus, it suffices to prove that
U−m(x, t)→ U−(x, t) as m→∞. (5.10)
To prove (5.10), we first note that
U−(x, t) = inf
ρ−∈S
sup
A+∈AC
J (x,t)(A+, ρ−(A+))
≥ inf
ρ−∈S
sup
A+∈ACm
J (x,t)(A+, ρ−(A+)).
In particular, given ε > 0, using that U−(x, t) is finite by our assump-
tions on g and that S = ∪mSm, we see that there exists m0 = m0(ε)
such that
U−(x, t) ≥ inf
ρ−∈S
sup
A+∈ACm
J (x,t)(A+, ρ−(A+)) ≥ U−m(x, t)− ε,
whenever m ≥ m0. We can therefore conclude that
U−(x, t) ≥ lim sup
m→∞
U−m(x, t).
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To complete the proof of (5.10), it hence only remains to prove that
U−(x, t) ≤ lim inf
m→∞
U−m(x, t). (5.11)
To prove (5.11), we first fix a strategy which estimates the infimum
when the supremum is taken over the controls ACk. Then, by choosing
k large enough, we can closely estimate the original supremum taken
over AC by a supremum taken over ACk. To write down the details,
we recall that
ACk := {A ∈ AC : Λ(A) ≤ k},
Sm := {ρ ∈ S : Λ(ρ) ≤ m},
for k = 1, 2, . . .. Fix ε > 0. For each k, we choose ρ−km ∈ Sm such that
sup
A+∈ACk
J (x,t)(A+, ρ−km(A
+))
≤ inf
ρ−∈Sm
sup
A+∈ACk
J (x,t)(A+, ρ−(A+)) + ε. (5.12)
Next, we define
ρ−m(A
+) := ρ−km(A
+) whenever A+ ∈ ACk \ACk−1,
and we set AC0 = ∅ in order to get started. Now, using that AC =
∪kACk we have, for k ≥ kε sufficiently large, that
U−(x, t) ≤ sup
A+∈AC
J (x,t)(A+, ρ−m(A
+))
≤ sup
A+∈ACk
J (x,t)(A+, ρ−m(A
+)) + ε
≤ inf
ρ−∈Sm
sup
A+∈ACk
J (x,t)(A+, ρ−(A+)) + 2ε,
where we on the last line have used (5.12). Assuming m ≥ kε, we can
choose k = m in the last display. Hence we can conclude that there
exists, given ε > 0, m0 = m0(ε) such that if m ≥ m0, then
U−(x, t) ≤ inf
ρ−∈Sm
sup
A+∈ACm
J (x,t)(A+, ρ−(A+)) + 2ε
= U−m(x, t) + 2ε.
This proves (5.11). 
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